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NOTE AND COMMENT
STA~ L:EGISLATION EXTENDING To NAVIGABL'e WATERS.-In Southern Pacific
Compan:y v. Jensen, 37 Sup. Ct.-, decided May 21, 1917, the Supreme Court
announces a decision in some respects of far reaching importance. It was
held therein, Mr. Justice HOLMES dissenting, that the WORKMEN'S CoMPENSA·
TION Acr of the State of New York did not support an award to the widow
and children of a workman killed on <board a ship of the Company while
at the pier in New York City. Clearly the terms of the New York act covered the case, unless the fact that the accident occurred on navigable waters
of the United States had a controlling effect to the contrary.
If the death was tortious, there can be no doubt under Atlaiitic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59, ·that it was a maritime tort and
within admiralty jurisdiction.
By ART. III, §2 of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States
is extended "To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and this
has been held to confer paramount power upon Congress to fix and d-::termine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. Butler
v. Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1. In the latter case
the court said: "As the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States to 'all cases of admiralty an<l maritime jurisdiction,' and as this juris-
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diction is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on the same subject
must necessarily be iµ the national legislature, and not in the State legislatu res."
It is well established, however, that within certain limits, rtot clearly de- ,
fined, State legislation in a sense affecting the general maritime law, may be
upheld. The Lottawa1111a, 21 Wall. 558 (lien for repairs upon vessel in
home port); The J. E. Rim1bell, 148 U. S. I (same); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (pilotage fees fixed); Es parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236
tsame). In Sherlock v. Alln1g, 93 U. S. 99, a death act of the State of IncEana was held to give a cause of action for negligent injury suffered on the
Ohio River; and in The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 3g8, and La Bo11rgog11e, 2IO U.
S. 95, the laws of Delaware and France, respectively, giving a cause of action
for negligently causing death were recognized and enforced in admiralty
cases, th,e d-<!aths having been caused· on the high seas. Under the general
maritime law there could have been no cause of action for causing death, but
the court enforced rights created by the law of Delaware and France. Apparently these laws were. not given. the effect of cha,nging the maritime lawthat could be done only by Congress-but as creating rights under .the state
municipal laiv ·.which. courts of admiralty would enforce, just, as one State
may give recognition to and en.fore~ rights created by the law· of another
State or country.
.
,,,
·'
On the other·hand1 State law cannQt authoriz~ _proceedings ill rem as in
admiralty. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 4u; The Glide, 167 U. S. 6o6. Nor
will a State statute creating_ liens, for materials used in repairing a foreign
ship urider circumstances, riot sufficieht to. create ~ lien under maritime law
be upheld.. The Roanoke, 189 U. S. !85. · And where a certain act would
give rise to a liability under maritime law, a rule of the law of the State
~vithin the territory of which the liability was incurred denying recov~ry
will be disregarded. W brkman v. Mayor, 179 U. S. 557..
' The CoMP:ENSATION AtT in the principal case, under the police powers of
the State, cre~ted a liability for. accidental injury not recognized by maritime
law, just as the la,\v of Delaware considered and upheld in The Hamilton,
supra, created a liability for negligently 'causing death not . recognized by
maritime law, and if tlie court was right in the earlier case in giving effect
in a court of admiralty to such right under the law of Delaware, it would
15eem 'that in the principal case like force should have been· given to the
New York statute. It is interesting that Mr. Justice Hor,Mi>s, who wrote
the unanimous opinion of the court in The Hamilton, vigorously dissented
in the principal case. A resulting lack of uniformity seems to have been the
main reason for the majority of'the court refusing to rec.ognize the liability
created by the statute. It is said that "If New York can subject foreign
ships coming into her ports to such obligations as those imposed by her compensation statute, other States may do likewise. The necessary consequence
would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime mat-.
ters which the Constitution was designed to establish, and freedom of naviga-
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tion between the States and with foreign countries would be seriously
hampered and imped~d". But how about the lack of uniformity under Sherlock v. Alling, supra, and The Hamilton, supra?
The court in determining whether State law shall stand as ,against or along
·with the maritime law, applies the same tests that are applied when the
(iuestion is between State action and the national control over interstate
commerce. In this connection it is interesting to refer to The New York
Central Railroad Company v. Winfield, d-ecided the same day, where it was
held, Mr. Justice BRAND1'IS and Mr. Justice CLARKE dissenting, that the
COMPENSATION Ac:r of New York did not apply to non-tortious injuries to
employees of the company, although the FEDtRAL EMPLOY$s' LIABILITY Act
covers only negligent injuries. It apparently was conceded by all that but
for the Federal Act the State statute would apply to employ~es engaged in
interstate commerce as well as to <those not so engaged. Congress, how-ever,
having acted, the State action was displaced.
·
R W.A.
~Li-:TTING ON ABANDONMENT BY TENANT AS SuRRtNDJ.>R BY OPERATION ot
LAw.-Among the very many difficult problems arising under the STATUTE oF
FRAUDS not the least troublesome has been that of surrender of ~states by
"operation of law." The Statute (29 Car. II, c.3,§3,) provided that "no leases
'~ * * shall * * * be assigned, granted, or surrendered, unless it be by deed or
note in writing, * * * or by act and OP.eration of law." Under a number of varying sitt1ations it has been held that a surrender by operation of law had been accomplished. See 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND Ti>NANT, §190. In Lyon v. Ree<!,
13 M. & \V. 285, Baron· P.<1.RKE, after referring to a number of such situations,
said: "It is needless to multiply examples; all the old cases will be found to
depend on the principle to which we have adverted, namely, an act done by or
to the owner of a particular estate, the validity of which he is estopped from
disputing, and which could not have been done if the particular ~state continued to exist. The law -there says, that the act itself amounts to a surrender. In such case it will be observed th-ere can be no question of intention. It takes place independently, and even in spite of intention."
Perhaps the most common situation giving rise: to a claim of surrender by
operation of law is the re-letting of· the premises :to a ne\v tenant after a
lessee has abandoned them before the end of his t~rm, notice of intention to.
continue to look to the original lessee to make. up deficiencies, if any, sometimes being given and sometimes not. 'Whatever may be said as to the
proper holding on sound legal reasoning, it is certainly true that the courts
are holding that such re-fatting does not necessarily bring about a surrertder
by operation of law; particularly is this true where <the lessor has given
notice to the first lessee that the new lease is made on his account, or without prejudice to any claims against him on the original lease. R11cker v. Mason (Okla. 1916), 161 Pac. 195, 15 MICH. L. ~v. 357; Hickman v. Breadford
(Iowa Ig17), 162 N. W. 53.
If such surrenders are,· as said by Baron PARKE, founded upon estoppels
and are wholly independent of intention, it would seem that cases of the above
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character must o.: considered as incorrectly decided. The new lease must be
taken, at least as between the parties rthereto, as valid; but how can it be
valid as against the lessor unless the first lease has somehow been gotten out
of the way? Can he ·be allowed to say that he has rtwo present leases of the
same premises running along concurrently? But the courts are far from
agreement with Baron P ARKt's doctrine that intention has nothing to do
with surrenders by operation of law. s~e Van Renssalaers Heirs v. Pen11.iman, 6 Wend. 569; Smith v. Kerr, 108 N. Y. 31, 15· N. E. 70; Thomas v.
Zumbalen, 43 Mo. 471; Joli11so11 v. Northem Trust Co., 265 Ill. 263, 1o6 N. E.
814; O'Neil v. Pearse, 87 N. J. L. 382, 94 At!. 312; Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370.
See also Nichells v. At/iersto11e, IO Q. B. 944; Zick v. Lo1ido1i United Tramways, Limited [1908), 2 K. B. 126. And that surrenders by operation of law
do not necessarily rest upon estoppels at all is the opinion expressed in an
interesting note in 5 IRISH JURIST n7. Cf. 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TtNAN't 1322.
,
.
But wheth~ the true explanation is estoppel or necessary implication from
certain facts not amounting to a technical estoppel, it is difficult to see how
in the usuaf case of re-letting after abandonment by a tenant before the end
of his term the old term can be said to be continuing. And the mere giving
of notice to the old tenant that the new lease shall not act as a rel~ase of
liability .would seem rto make no real difference. An agreement by t.he original
lessee may well produce a different.result., Whatever may. be said as t? the
·necessity 'for. estoppel to bring about. a suri:ender by operation of law, it
would= seem quite proper to say that, wh~re all the., elements of an estoppel
tCi asserrt the continuance o·f the relation of landlord and tenant are present
there ·has ·been a surrender. by operation of law. It is submitted that in the
type·of cases under discussion ·there·is such an estoppel. . '
·
The- prevailing doctrine undoubtedly is due. very largely to a gesire on the
part of the courts to avoid >imposing what.seems to be a. hardship upon ~he
landlord.· 'It should be riot~d that. a lease can be· very easily so worded
tliat the· lessor -may be protected and. at the same time avoid the difficulties
herein referred to. See, however, Whitcomb v. Brant (N. J. 1917), 100 Att.
175, where such a provision in a lease led to· another very interesting ~if
ficulty, the lessor on re-letting getting a higher re.nt than provided for in
the original lease.. It was held that the lessor did not .need rto- account to
the first less-ee for such excess.
R. W. A.
T:in~ p ATENTABILITY OF A MtNTAL 'PRocr:ss.-The. fact of possession has
bee'n so correlated· with the theory of properly that it is difficult to ·dissociate
ownership from the possibility of physical possession. One finds that the
average lawyer, even though· he may define a right in rem as a right enforcible against any persoi:i, is extremely apt, unless after especial thought,
to explain that it .is enfbrcible against anyone because' it pertains to a thing
r.apab!e of physical possession and control, a thing that could· lie actually
sequestered. from .all other persons. .Not at all inftequently the term property .has been judicially' stripped even :of its significance·
of a right, and
con.
.
~
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fined to the objective material thing to which the right might apply. As a
matter of fact, comparatively few things have ever been legally recognized
as the object of property which have not been tangible. The right to one's
reputation, and, more lately recognized, the right to privacy, for instance,
are rights in rem, although incapable of tangible possession. The right to
have a contract performed without interference by a third party and, it has
been said, the right created by assignment of a chose in action, are equally
rights in rem. These, and other res, are mere concepts, in no sense whatever
corporeal, although the rights concerning them so appertain to the particular person in whose favor they exist as to be truly property rights, and
correctly said to be owned by him. But the whole number of these is small
compared to the quantity of tangible things which are the subject of property,
and even these rights are not usually spoken of, even judicially, in terms of
rroperty, as are those pertaining to tangible things.
This difficulty in recognizing a mere mental concept, incapable of physical
custody, as a proper subject of legal ownership, is quite evident in the law
relating to patents for inventions. The Common Law recognized no property right whatever in an invention. It is possible that it did admit -existence• of a right in respect to the rem of an author's concepts, as formulated in
words .by him, but that right was so early covered by statute as to leave the
state of the Common Law in some doubt. In respect to inventions, however, there is no doubt-one had no property right, as such, in his mental
concept of a means for accomplishing a given result. So long ;i.s he kept
his idea of means to the particular end locked in his own mind, it could
not be legally dragged from him. Even if he revealed it, in such a way
that the recipient of the knowledge was pledged to secrecy, equity. would
enjoin a breach of that pledge by the holder of the secret. But if the
idea became known, in any way, its enjoyment was free to the public. The
conceptor of the idea had no control over it whatever; he consequently had
no more property in it than did the latest of" those who had learned it. Any
tangible thing in which he might embody the idea, being itself subject to
control, was his property, just as would be any chattel which one might construct, but the idea embodied in the chattel was open to use by all the world
who could find it out.
Any right fa rem to the sole enjoyment of the idea depended altogether
upon an express grant thereof by the sovereign, and still depends, in
this country, wholly upon a grant of such right from the government. The
statutes permitting such grants, and the patents granted thereunder, have
been interpreted and construed by courts trained in the Common Law and accustomed to its assumptions. It is not suprising, therefore, to find occasionally evinced the feeling that the subject matter of a patent, that is, an "in\·ention," ought to ibe something more than a mere concept bf means,
indeed must be a tangible thing of some sort. The very statute conveys this
impression in directing the issue of a patent for an "art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter."
Fortunately for the undoubted purpose of the patent statutes, this has
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been confined to expression and not carried into actual decision. It has not
been wholly innocuous, because of the confusion it appears to have caused
between "invention" and "evidence of the existence of" a particular invention. But so far as actual decisions are concerned, and in all careful expression, it is unquestionably the concept of the means to the end which is
the subject of the patented property, and not merely the particular tangible
things which may be constructed in embodiment of the idea. Indeed, things
which are so constructed by others than the patentee, however wrongfully
it may be done, are not the property of the patentee and do not become so
because of their infringing character.
Unless a patent is extremely narrow, the patentee's protection is not restricted to the particular machine or device he may describe. His monopoly
includes all machines of the same type and purpose which, though different
in subst~ntial form, do not involve any inventive difference. These can not
be called the "same" machine as the one described by the patent since they
are obviously materially different, but, as they -embody the same idea of
means, they are called "equivalents." If it were the tangible machine which
was patented, this breadth of protection could not follow. _It can be predicated only on the fact that the invention protected is the idea of means
embodied in the material means literally described.
A good illustration of the fact .that it is the idea ·which is patented, and
not the substantial -embodiment, is the case of Tilghman v. Proctor, w2·u. ·S.
' 707. The patentee in this case claimed nothing substantial at all, but said
merely, "I claim, as my invention, the manufacturing of fat acids a~d
glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature and
pressure." In his description he c!id set out a particular tangible means by
which this could be accomplished. The court held that his protection was
not limited to the described means ·but covered the accomplishing of the result by obviously different material aids. It named the invention a "process"
or a "mode of acting," and distinguished it from a "machine'' by ·saying
"The one [machine] is visible to the eye-an object of perpetual observation. The other is a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when
being executed or performed."
Practically all of the definitions likewise concede that "The invention itself
is an intellectual process or operation," Pliila. Etc. R. R. Co. v. ·Stimpson, 14
Pet. 448, or in other more or less precise expression indicate that it is the
mental concept, and not the tangible embodiment of it which really constitutes the subject of the patent. (The quoted definition is, of course, inexact to the extent that it attempts to express a "thing'' in terms of an "act,"
but the !f:hought contained in it is clearly that an invention is a concept.) It
would be supererogatory to demonstrate further this fact.
An idea of means which is not capable of embodiment as an objective
means has never, so far as the writer is aware, been the subject of an
adjudicated patent. It is therefore an undecided question whether an invention which does not require tangible instrumentalities to effectuate the
result desired is patentable. To argue that it is patentable would seem, it
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must be confessed, like opposing a merely conjured contradiction, were it
not for the number of patent law experts who have expressed a belief that
such an idea could not be subject of a patent.
It is difficult, though not impossible, to conceive of an idea of means
which does not involve the use of tangible instrumentalities. It largely
clcpends on what one admits to be the "instrumentalities." There has been
published, apparently at the author's expense, an amusing pamphlet, unconsciously amusing, and rather pathetically so, called "The Bitter, Bitter
Cry of Outcast Inventors." The author's plaint is the refusal of the British
government to patent an invention of his, and the suggestion of various
publishers, to whom he offered the exposition of his idea, that he rest
and recuperate in the country. His concept was a system of shorthand. To
utilize it, fifteen men sit in a row, with fifteen more behind them. When
a speech to be reported is commenced, person number one in the rear row
taps the shoulder of number one in the front row just as the first word of
the speech is being uttered. At the utterance of the second word, person
number two of the rear ranks taps the shoulder of person number two in the
front rank. Thus each rear rank man taps the shoulder of the man in front
oi him, in rotation, as the consecutive words of the speech are delivered. The
person so tapped writes the word being uttered as the signal is given. At the
end of the speech, a compilation of all the written words becomes a verbatim
report of the speech. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that this concept involved inventive genius, would it be -patentable?
Even if it were admitted to be patentable, it might be said actually to
utilize substantive means, namely, the persons of the thirty men, to effectuate
its end, and therefore not to be conclusive of the issue. If one were to
e\·olve a imthod for trisecting the angle, it is possible that the pencil and
paper required-if only to present an unknown angle-might be called a
substantive "means." Arithmeticians and mathematicians, however, are frequently evolving short-cuts to a desired end which involve purely mental
processes, and which overwhelm the non-mathematical mind with astonished
admiration at the rapidity with which the given, result is reached. If one of
these methods of arriving at the desired result were the creation of inventive
genius-and surely the productions of mathematicians are more truly the result of something transcending mere trained skill, common to all their
calling, than are many mechanical inventions-would it be patentable?
The only possible objection is ;,. lingering vestige of the common feeling
that property is physical. But when the Patent Law has been pressed to
the point, it has invariably acted en the assumption that patented property
is intangible. It is true that intangible property can not be "made,'~ and it
is loosely said-again the supposition of physical property-that it is not
vendible, yet the patent statute gives an exclusive right to make, use and vend
the invention. If making, using and vending were all necessary to constitute
infringement, it is obvious that a mere mental process could not be infringed,
and therefore was not presumably intended as the subj-act matter of a
patent. But the phrase has been consistently interpreted as meaning make,
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use or vend. It is in nowise necessary that an infringer do all of the forhidden acts, the doing of any one of them is sufficient, and it does not follow that patentable invention must be capable of enjoym~nt or infringement
in all three ways. Its susceptibility to "use" would surely be sufficient.
There is nothing therefore in the wording of the statute to preclude the
patenting of such a process for accomplishing a desired result.
No more is there any reason in law, as established extraneous to the patent
decisions, why the inventor should not have an exclusive right to the use
of such an invention, except the bald fact that the Common Law did not
recognize a right in rem to any invention. It did recognize other intangible
res, however, so that there was no legal impossibility in an intangible ambit
for a property right. As respects inventions particularly, the Common Law
was changed by <the statute. The logic of the change undoubtedly extends
it to all.inventions, whether they utilize tangible instrumentalities or not.
It is true that the exclusive right to such an invention might be extremely
difficult to enforce, but "the mere practical unsatisfactoriness of the remedy
has never derogated the completeness of <the right. Furthermore, it is not
inconceivable that the exclusive right to use such an invention might have
a very practicable value. If the means, the mental process, were one which
could be used on the stage, for instance, to mystify audiences of tho'se who
were unacquainted with its details, the right to its use for such purposes
might well be of considerable monetary value. 'Whether it is the law
that such a concept is p~tentab1e, only the Supreme Court can say. Till that
_tribunal has spoken, it is, like the presence or absence of the inventive quality, a matter of opinion. But it may be said of this, as a certain lecturer
used to say of invention, "if there is no reason why it is not, it probably is."

.

J.13. W.

STATU'l'ORY LIABII,ITY oF SHi.ro;noI.DERS oN ToRT LIABILITIES AGAINST THE

CoRPORATION.-In the recent case :if Lininger v. Botsford, 163 Pac. 63, it was
necessary for the California Court of Appeals to pass upon ·whether the term
"liability" as used in ,Art. 12, §3 of the California Constitution, and §322 of
the Civil ·Code, imposing upon shareholders of corpcrations their proportional
share of the "liabilities" of their corporation, over and above the unpaid part
of their shares, extended to torts of th~ corpoi;ation. The court held that
while the weight of authority was that that tort liabilities were not included within the scope of such provisions it had been held in California that
the term "liability" included claims ex: delicto, and therefore the share. holders must be held liable in this case. The case cited as to the construction of "liability," Miller & Lux v. Kern County Land Co., 134 Cal. 586,
sustains the court in its finding. But the court goes further and cites Kelly
\". Clark, 21 Mont. 29I, and Buttner v. Adams, 236 Fed. 105, to further support the decision. The former of these cases involved common law not
statutory liability; the latter involved only the question of whether the liability was primary or secondary, and the matter of ultimate liability was
not raised. The case serves to emphasize that the confusion and lack of
discrimination which characterize the discussion of this question in all the
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texts and most of the judicial opinions have been by no means dispelled
eyen at this late date.
The first element of the confusion is that statutory liability is confused,
on the one hand, with common law liability, where there is no question that
the shareholder is liable for claims ex delicto of the corporation; and on
the other hand, with penal liability for failure to perform some statutory. corporate duty, where it is equally clear that no liability exists, unless by the
express terms of the statute. The text writers are always clear enough on
these two distinctions in their te:i..'i:s but entirely lose sight of them when
they start to cite cases. In many of the judicial opinions the courts seem
blissfully unconscious of any distinction whatsoever.
Another and still more effective element of confusion lies in the fact
that the whole matter is one of statutory construction, that different theories
of construction are employed, that the precise words of the particular statute
are always of the utmost importance, and that cases construing radically different statutes are indiscriminately cited to support the construction announced of the statute under consideration. These elements, together with
others hardly less important, such as whether the liability is secondary or
primary, and whether it is contractual or statutory in nature, acting and reacting on one another, have resulted in a muddle fearful to contemplate.
In the first place it must be remembered that the liability imposed is purely
statutory in nature. It had no existence at common law. Indeed at common law exemption from such liability was one of the most noteworthy characteristics of corporations. Warner & Ray v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 103;
Terry v. Little, IOI U. &.. 216; note in 43 Am. St. Rep. 834 Therefore
though the statutes are "remedial" they are also "in derogation of the common law," which we take to mean that such statutes deprive shareholders
of rights and immunities conferred upon them under the common law. And
it must be again emphasized that since the liability is statutory the precise
language of the statutes is always of the utmost importance. Terry v.
Little, supra.
There are three theories of construction appli<!d in the cases: (I) Liberal
-The theory is that the statute is remedial and as such should· be liberally
construed to correct all the evils which the legislature intended to remedy.
This theory is specifically applied in but four cases, viz, Carver v. Braint1·ee Mfg. Co., 5 F-::d. Cas. No. 2485; Rider v. Fritchie, 49 Oh. St. 285; Flen1zikm v. Marshall, 43 S. C. So; and Henley v. Meyers, 76 Kans. 723, 737. All
these cases hark back to Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., in which the opinion
is given by Mr. Justice STORY. But that opinion proceeds entirely on the
remedial nature of the statute, without considering the common law rights of
the shareholders, and the case is expressly condemned in Child v. Boston &
Fair/zavm Iron Wks., 137 Mass. 516, where Fmn, J., construing the same
statute considered by STORY, J., says that "the decision of Mr. Justice STORY
stands unsupported by any direct authority, either before or since" ; in
Rogers v. Stag Mi11ing Co., 171 S. W. 678, which refers to the decision as
based on "strained construction"; in Jones v. Rankin, 19 N. Mex. 56, where
the decision of STORY, J., is said to be against "the almost universal current
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of authority in 1he United States, including the United States Supreme
Court."
(2) Strict-The theory is that, because the statutes are "in derogation of
the common law,'' depriving shareholders of immunities long enjoyed under
the common law, the scope of the statute should not be extended h~yond the
natural meaning of the words actually employed. The weight of authority
s~ems clearly with 1his view.
Some of the cases are: Jones v. Rankin,
supra; Shermaii v. Heacock, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 58; Gray v. Coffin, 9 Cush.
(Mass.) 192; Child v. Boston & Fairhave1i Iron Wks., supra; Rogers v.
Stag Mining Co., supra.
(3) R~asonable or Natural.-This is merely modifying the "strict" construction view so as to interpret the words of the statute according to their
reasonable and natural meaning, not straining their scope so as to give effect
to an assumed intention of the legislators, on the one hand, nor employing
them in ·their narrowest and most restricted sense, on the other. It is definitely formulated in this connection in but one case, Boh11 v. Brown, 33 Mich.
::<57, but is in effect followed in most of the cases cited under the "strict
construction" theory. Regarded by itself or as a modification of the narrowest statement of the "strict construction~' theory it seems the only proper
rule to adopt if the court is not to usurp purely l:!gislative functions. And
again we must revert to the same <;:uestion with regard t-0 1he specific statute
to be considered: "What is meant by the precise language employed in this
statute?" The writer will not attempt to deal with each statute separately
but will attempt briefly to state the law with regard to certain words and
phrases commonly employed.
(a) "Liabilities"-This 1~rm includes tort claims against the corporation.
Lininger v. Botsford, 163 Pac. 63; Miller & L11~ v. Kern Comity Land Co.,
134 Cal. 586; Wood
Currey, 57 Cal. 2o8.
(b) "Demands"-This term includes tort claims against the corporation.
Heacock v. Sherman, supra.
·
. (c) "Dues"-This term includes tort claims against the corporation, Henley v. Meyers, supra; Flenniken v. M arslzall, supra; Rider v. Fritclzie, supra.
But see Ward" v. Joslin, 100 Fed. 676, contra.
(d) "Debts contracted"-This term does not include tort claims against
the corporation, even 1:hough reduced to judgment. Heacock v. Shermat;,
supra; Bohn v. Brown, supra; Child v. Boston & Fairhaven Iron Wks., supra;
Rogers v. Stag Mining Co., supra; Contra, Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co.,
supra, a case which has been sufficiently discussed above.
(e) "Creditors"-This term does not include those holding claims against
the corporation, founded on the tort of the corporation. Do;,•le v. Kimball, 23'
Misc. 431; Ward v. Joslin, supra. Contra, Henley v. Meyers, supra.
In conclusion it may be stated that this summary is intended to be neither
comprehensive nor conclusive. Again it must be emphasized that each
statute must be considered separately with regard to the particular language
used and must stand .on its own foundation. Nevertheless the writer believes that a careful reading of the cases cited will materially aid in arriving
at a sound interpretation· of the statute under consideration.
E. B. H.
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